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Failure of a Large Circular Excavation
R. E. Olson

R. E. Heuer

L. P. Gilvin Professor of Civil Engineering, University of Texas,
Austin, Texas

Geotechnical Consultant, McHenry, Illinois

SYNOPSIS

A circular excavation, 117 feet (36 m) in diameter by 90 feet (27 m) deep, was designed by an experienced engineering finn
and construction was performed by an experienced contractor. Nevertheless, the excavation support system suffered a
complete collapse long before the maximum depth was reached. The failure is described and its causes are discussed.

INTRODUCTION

A buried tank, with an inside diameter of 105 feet (32m),
a wall thickness of 4 feet (1.2 m), and a depth to its bottom
of 88 feet (27 m), was designed for a new sewage treatment
plant at a site in Central Texas. The designer made a single
soil boring at the center of the excavation and found that
there was about 34 feet (10m) of cohesive soil overlying a
clay shale. A well known engineering firm, with wide
international experience, designed a support system
consisting of steel ring beams with vertical timber lagging.
When the excavation reached a depth of about 42 feet (13
m) (Fig. 1), the support system collapsed and was a total
loss.

c - - - concrete

ring beam
- - - cohesive soil

tie rods used as hangers
(one shown as an example)
...____ mixed clay, silt,
sand, and gravel

In the resulting litigation, there was an opportunity to
consider the design assumptions and the construction
method, and to participate with experts in several fields in
an effort to determine the cause(s) of the collapse. As usual
in such cases, the various parties disagreed as to matters of
fact as well as matters involving interpretation. Relevant
parts of these considerations are reviewed in this manuscript
and conclusions drawn regarding the causes of the failure.

clay shale
excavation depth at the
time of failure (42' deep,
13m)

Fig. 1 Cross Section Through the West Side of the
Excavation at the Time it Failed

SITE CONDITIONS

The site is flat and located in the flood plain of a river.
The single soil boring specified by the design engineer,
located at the center of the shaft, indicated the profile shown
in Table 1. The soil boring was made during a dry period
in the summer and no water table was encountered. The
closest additional boring was 450 feet (137m) away. That
boring, and others at a greater distance, showed the
presence of 19 to 35 feet (6-11 m) of cohesive soil over 7 to
12 feet (2-4 m) of sand and gravel. The designer estimated
that the sand and gravel layer terminated about 200 feet (60
m) away from the edge of this shaft and thus estimated that
there would be only minor seepage of water into the

excavation. To be on the safe side, the designer assumed the
possible presence of 3 feet (1 m) of relatively cohesionless
soil just above the claystone.
DESIGN

The designers considered the site an obvious one for use of
ring beams and timber lagging but indicated that liner plates
799
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Table 1 Soil Profile from the Single Soil Boring
Depth
feet
(metres)
0-12
(0-4)
12-34
(4-10)
34-41
(10-12.5)
>41
(>12.5)

Horizontal Pressure (kPa)
0

Description
SILTY CLAY, dark brown to brown,
calcareous, organic material at top, sandy at
bottom
SANDY SILTY CLAY, tan to rusty tan,
brown, orange brown, calcareous, frequent
shell fragments, some gravel and iron
staining at the bottom
CHALKY CLAYSTONE, tan and light gray,
weathered, occasional fossils and pyrite,
upper few feet are fractured
CHALKY CLAYSTONE, mostly gray,
slickensided and fractured

100

150

so~~_.--~~~~~._~~~--1s

0

1000

2000

3000

Horizontal Pressure (psf)

might be needed occasionally. The cohesive soils should
stand unsupported for reasonable periods of time to allow
placement of the supports. The lagging would provide
needed local support for the fractured claystone.

Fig. 2 Various Distributions of Earth Pressure
Table 2.-Ring Beams and Lagging Selected by Designer
Depth
Vertical
Range,
Spacing
Steel
of Beams
feet
(metres)
ft. (m.)
Section
4
0-25
(1.2)
(0-7.6)
W24x55
25-57.5
4
(1.2)
(7.6-17.5) W24x68
4
57.5-89.5
(1.2)
_(17.5-27.3}_ W24x104

A post-failure deposition by one of the design engineers
led to the inference that the designer had not given serious
consideration to any other support system in the overlying
soils but had considered a variety of support systems in the
underlying fissured claystone. In the deposition, the
engineer claimed that steel sheeting could not be driven at
this site, and that most other types of support would be
uneconomical.
No original design computations could be obtained for
the steel ring beams. The pre-bid geotechnical report
mentioned need for only "nominal support" in the overlying
soils. Testimony from one structural engineer was that the
designer considered the beams to be in pure compression
and did not consider the possibility of buckling failure.
Design drawings contained the design pressure distribution
labeled "Pressure used in Design" in Fig. 2. To resist those
pressures, the designers recommended use of steel ring
beams and vertical wood lagging (Table 2), assuming that
the claystone would be encountered at a depth of about 34
feet (10 m). The designer's pressure diagram has been
extended to the actual excavation depth of about 42 feet (13
m) in Fig. 2.
Ring beam spacing was 4ft (1.2 m), except that rings 2
and 3 were 5 ft (1.5 m) apart.

Thickness of
Lagging
in. (i:nn:i)
2
(50)
3
{75)
3
.(75)

Lagging
Coverage
min.%
25
50
100

The construction documents provided that the contract
was to be responsible for ensuring that the soil conditio:
were in accord with design assumptions and that the ril
beams were adequately designed. The contract was let 011
fast track basis because the city was under heavy pressure
improve the quality of the effluent that it was pumping ba
into the adjacent river.
The contractor hired a structural engineer to exami
the support system and subsequently increased the size
the top group of ring beams to W24x62.
CONSTRUCTION
The contractor began construction in November with
excavation about 11 feet (3.3 m) deep, without support, E
constructed a concrete ring beam (Fig. 1). This beam wa
feet deep (2m), 5 feet (1.5 m) wide at the top, and 3 feel
m) wide at the bottom, with a vertical inner edge (Fig.
Shaft lining began with lagging boards that were 12 fee1
m) long. Steel ring beam number 2 was placed first. 11
the upper ring (number 1) was placed and the upper lin
backfilled. Normal downward shaft excavation then begE

The ring beams were tied to beams above and below
using one-inch (25 mm) diameter steel tie rods spaced every
six feet (1.8 m) around the circumference of the excavation.
Each tie rod was connected to the two adjacent ring beams.
The tie rods between ring 1 and 2 were encased in pipe so
ring 1 could be supported on ring 2, whereas other tie rods
were only in tension and had no pipe covers.
Square frame blackouts in the ring beam system were
present at several locations around the shaft, extending from
rings 4 through 6. One was located at the top of the initial
failure area. Ring 5 was not continuous across this area.
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The ring beams arrived on site, precurved, with e
representing l/15th of the circumference. The contrac
800

1

welded groups of three sections together on the ground
surface and then lowered these units into position. Once the
first sections were in place, excavation was carried out over
the entire bottom to about one foot (0.3 m) below the
bottom edge of the next ring beam. The excavation
extended about one foot (0.3 m) outside the projected
position of the outer edge of the next ring beam. The next
section was then lowered into position and hung from the
ring above using tie rods. The wood lagging was placed on
the outside of the ring beams and temporarily supported
from the steel by driving a nail into the lagging and bending
it over the outer flange of a steel ring. Wood wedges and
blocking were placed between the lagging and the natural
ground to provide support. Straw was stuffed into the voids
where water seeps were encountered.

On the west side of the excavation, when down to about
ring beam 8, a fire, caused by welding activities, developed
in the hay backfill, and forced the replacement of lagging
from beams 3 and 6. The firemen used substantial amounts
of water in fighting the fire. The new lagging was wedged
into place as before but no special efforts were made to
replace soil that may have been softened.
FAILURE
In early December, during the middle and end of the week
of the failure, there were substantial rains in the area. On
Monday, a block of soil, described as 3x4x4 feet (lxl.2xl.2
m), slid into the excavation on the west side, in the area of
rib 9, apparently without causing concern on the part of
anyone. It appears that routine hay and wood backfill
operations were performed and work continued.

Actual soil conditions were different from those
predicted from the single soil boring. A panoramic sketch
of the soils exposed by the excavation is shown in Fig. 3.
South

West

North

On Thursday evening, at about 5PM, workers were
placing ring 11 at a depth just above the interface between
the soils and the claystone. On the west side, water was
flowing into the excavation through the lower gravel
"channel filling" and two cavities were noted behind the
rings and lagging. The contractor tried to use hay and
timber cribbing to fill the cavities but the holes continued to
enlarge. The construction superintendent for the day shift,
which ended at 3PM, testified that the main void was about
4 feet (1.2 m) wide, 2 feet (0.7 m) deep, and 12 feet (3.7 m)
high early in the day but had widened to about 12-15 feet (4
to 5 m) by the end of his shift. He was not concerned about
the void although they were in the process of trying to stop
its expansion. By about 9:30PM, the two voids had merged
into one void along the gravel/claystone interface with a
horizontal dimension along the circumference of the
excavation estimated to be 50 feet (15 m), a maximum
height of about 12 to 15 feet (4-5 m), and a radial
dimension of about 5 feet (1.5 m). Workers changed tactics
and welded some 2x2 (50x50 mm) steel angles to the outside
of rings 8 through 10 and tried to construct angle iron
bracing projecting into the void between the ring beams and
the soil, upon which to support timber cribbing and hay
filling of the void.
At about 12:30 AM, workers standing in the bucket of a
front end loader, well up in the air, and working on the
cribbing system, observed that they, and the loader, were
slowly being pushed back toward the center of the
excavation. They also heard loud popping noises and what
sounded like an explosion in the general vicinity of ring
beam 5.

East

........
....
Q)

.&
._,

....a.

..t:
Q)

0

40 cay,
I sit,
I
sand, gravel
50
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Fig. 3

Panoramic Sketch of the Excavation

On the east side there was about 13 feet (4 m) of clay, then
10 feet (3 m.) of sandy clay, and then 17 feet (5 m) of clean
sand.
On the west side of the excavation, an apparent buried
erosional surface cut down through the sandy clay and clean
sand and into the underlying claystone. Overlying the
erosional surface in the claystone was a layer of sand and
gravel in tum overlain by mixed clay, silt, sand, and gravel.
Above about 33 feet (10m) depth, the "buried channel" was
filled with the clay soils present at shallower depth around
the entire excavation.

All workers were removed from the excavation. The
support system on the west side began to collapse (Fig. 1).
The failure progressed downwards, and the entire west side
of the support system had failed by 3:30AM. Over the next
few days, the entire support system unraveled and collapsed
into the excavation as a twisted pile of steel (Fig. 4).

Raveling and small caveins occurred on the north and
east sides early in December, apparently in the clean sand,
which dried rapidly when exposed. The contractor us~d
3x6-inch (75 x 150 mm) wood cribbing and hay to backftll
the voids initially. Several larger openings were filled with
cement grout. Except for these problems, the project
proceeded on schedule through the top forty feet (12m).

Third International Conference on Case Histories in Geotechnical Engineering
Missouri University of Science and Technology
http://ICCHGE1984-2013.mst.edu

Eyewitness accounts and the locations of the steel rings
immediately after the initial stages of the failure, indicate
that the failure involved an inward buckling of rings
starting with ring #5 at the top.
801

Laboratory Tests
During the early phases of the investigation it was believed
that there may have been an earth pressure problem in the
cohesive soils at shallow depths and that this problem may
have led to buckling of the beams. Accordingly, hand
carved samples of some of the shallow soils were obtained
and one each, drained and undrained, stage-type triaxial
compression tests were performed. The failure envelopes
had the following intercepts and slopes:

I'

c = 900 psf = 43 kPa

drained:

c = 150 psf = 11 kPa i= 27 deg.

deg.

The finite value of ~ for the undrained tests makes it
clear that the samples were not saturated. No Atterberg
limit tests were performed on the specific samples used for
triaxial tests. However, numerous tests with adjacertt
samples showed that LL ranged from 31 to 38%, PI from
16 to 24%, water contents from 16 to 24%, with one sample
classified as ML and the others as CL. The sand/silt/clay
fractions were generally about 15/55130 %.

.I

Fig. 4

~=19

undrained:

Photograph of Collapsed Support System on the
WestSide

The time sequence of initial failure movements of rings
is uncertain because the evidence was obliterated by
movements in later stages of the failure.

Failure Area
POST MORTEM BY THE
STRUCTURAL CONSULTANTS

DESIGNER

AND
Attempts by the first author to investigate conditions in the
failure zone, several days after the failure, were only
partially successful because the lower rings were buried in
debris and the upper soils had slid down over the soils that
were adjacent to the excavation in the failure zone.

Subsequent to the failure, the contractor filed a claim for
changed conditions on the basis that the thick sand layer on
the east side had not been shown in construction documents,
nor had the thick gravel seam in the "buried channel" on the
west side. The design engineer rejected the claim, pointing
out that the contractor was responsible for ensuring the
accuracy of the soil profile and performing the structural
design. Further, the design engineer claimed that the
contractor should have been able to stabilize the cavein
more quickly.

However, during reconstruction, the steel and some of
the soil debris was removed, and it was possible to access
part of the west side where the failure apparently began. In
that area, the top forty feet (12 m) (estimated depth) was
cohesive but the top ten feet (3 m) (estimated) of supposed
claystone was actually a mixture of soils ranging from clay
to gravel. A sketch of the zone where failure was believed
to have begun is shown in Fig. 5. The "red bed" was a red,
highly plastic clay, with LL=72%, and PI=50%. Water was
still flowing out of the lower gravel layer a month after the
failure. The gravel layers may have been channel deposit!
with high pore water pressures resulting from exposure oi
the gravel at a higher elevation off site.

A structural engineer, representing the designer, rejected
eyewitness accounts of inwards movements of upper beams
and concluded that the beams buckled outwards. He also
argued that ring #5 did not bear properly on the blockout
and was thus subjected to a twist for which it had not been
designed. A structural engineer representing the contractor
testified that the rings were unsafe for buckling failure.
SUBSEQUENT SITE INVESTIGATIONS
Site Visits
The first author visited the site on the following Monday
afternoon (about 70 hours after the failure began) and on a
number of other occasions during the next month. At the
time of the first visit, water was flowing into the excavation
through the debris on the west side. Soil samples were
taken and field conditions were photographed. Much of the
site, including the failure zone, was inaccessible.
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Fig. 5
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Sketch of Exposed Soil in the Area of th'
Failure (Section about 35 feet=ll m wid'
and 15 feet=4.5 m high)

1.2 m here), fs=allowable steel stress, and A is the ring
cross sectional area. If blocking space is not very close, a
different analysis may be used which accounts for the
bending moments induced in the curved rin~ between
blocking points. Calculations suggest that the nng beams
(Table 2) have adequate capacity to support the "Pressure
used in Design" shown in Fig. 2.

Earth Pressure Computations
For confining pressures approximating those in the field,
the triaxial samples failed at low axial strains (1%
undrained to 4% drained). In consideration of the
construction method, which left significant thicknesses of
soil unsupported before installation of the rings and lagging,
and the large diameter-to-depth ratio at the time of failure,
it is believed that earth pressures may be closer to classical
Rankine values rather than those appropriate for
prestressed, braced, or tied back, excavations.

Complete buckling failure and collapse of the
underground support systems is uncommon, and generally
not well understood by the profession. Two different
structural consultants argued, after the failure, that the ring
beams were inadequate because they did not have adequate
capacity according to a buckling equation of the form:

A Rankine-type analysis was performed for active earth
pressures using the soil profile assumed by the design
engineer. Under undrained conditions, using the failure
envelope reported earlier, and a total unit weight of 120 pcf
(18.8 kNfm3) the earth pressure would be as shown by
curve 1 in Fig. 2 (no pressure to a depth of 21 feet (6.4 m)
and the pressure at a depth of 42 feet (12.8 m) would be
about 1280 psf (61.3 kPa). Vertical scarps of the order of
this height were observed in the clays on the west side
during the early stages of the clean up so the computations
appear realistic.

3EI
Per= R3

where Per=critical external pressure on the support system,
at which failure occurs, E and I are the lining material and
sectional properties, and R=radius as before.
An equation of the form of Eq. 2 is not applicable in the
present case, nor is it applicable to most conditions in
underground construction. This equation is based on the
assumption that the support is subjected to a uniform
external fluid pressure. Failures of steel casings in slurryfilled holes, or surrounded by fluid grout, have occurred as
predicted by this equation, or by similar equations which
account for initial out-of-roundness of the cylinder due to
manufacturing tolerances.

Under drained conditions, the earth pressure depends on
the assumed water conditions above the water table. If the
water table is set at a depth of 42 feet (12.8 m) at the top of
the claystone, and the water pressures above the water table
are zero, then curve 2 (Fig. 2) is calculated, with a free
standing height of only 4 feet (1.2 m) and an earth pressure
of 1210 psf 57.9 kPa) at 42 feet (12.8 m).
If the pore water pressures above the water table are the
no-flow negative values, then curve 3 (Fig. 2) is obtained.
There is no earth pressure down to 22 feet (6.6 m) and the
earth pressure is 1710 psf (81.9 kPa) at 42 feet (12.8 m).

These boundary conditions do not apply to underground
linings which are in contact with the surrounding soil (or
rock) around their entire perimeter. Such linings include
shaft and tunnel ring beams or continuous shells (steel pipe,
steel liner plate, thin concrete or shotcrete shells) which are
well blocked or grouted in place. Total collapse of such
linings, by buckling failure, is rare because of soil-structure
interaction effects. Whenever an inward deforming bulge
begins to form in the lining, due to external soil pressure,
arching tends to develop in the soil to relieve the driving
pressure. Simultaneously, adjacent outward bulges of the
lining induce passive soil p'ressures which tend to restrain
further movement.

Analyses under drained conditions for the actual soil
profile on the west side are shown as curve 4 in Fig. 2.
Soil conditions at the time of the failure are unclear.
Although it had rained periodically for the preceding six
days, some eyewitnesses claimed to see dust blown into the
air during parts of the collapse.
A comparison of the earth pressures diagrams suggests
that the pressures :used by the design enginee~ were
reasonable and conservative and that problems wtth the
earth pressure computations was not the cause of the failure.

Accordingly, buried cylinders, properly installed, have
much higher buckling strength than defined by the fluid
buckling case of Eq. 2. Buckling equations of forms such as
the following (Allgood, 1972) are applicable to most
underground cases:

ANALYSES OF RING BEAM DESIGN
According to conventional design procedures, the steel
ring beams must have adequate capacity to support ~e
external soil pressures while acting as pure compress10n
members. The design condition is given by:
T=p Rs =fsA

Per= C

~ Es(~~)

(3)

where c is a parameter determined by boundary conditions
such as depth of burial and Poisson's· ratio of soil and lining
materials, Es=deformation modulus of the soil, E and I are
as defined before, D=2R=diameter of the excavation.
Boulson (1985) summarized the theoretical basis of

(1)

where T=compression thrust in the ring, p=design soil
pressure, R=radius of excavation, s=ring spacing (4 feet =
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(2)
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buckling strength of underground structures, and various
analytical and experimental studies which have been made.
Note that the controlling parameter of the lining is the ring
stiffness EI!R3 or EIJD3. Bucking failures of underground
support systems can generally occur only in unusual
conditions, such as extremely loose soils which permit large
lining deformations (diametral deformations in the range of
15% to 20% can be tolerated before snap-through buckling
failure in the first mode), highly concentrated loadings, or
unusually low ring stiffness of the support or lining.
Although the ring stiffness of the W24x68 ring beams for
this case, about their strong (x-x) axis, is relatively low,
about EI/03=0.42 psi (2.9 kPa), the second author has
reported successful use of linings with ring stiffnesses as
low as EI!D3=0.05 psi (0.35 kPa) in shafts of approximately
the same dimensions as this case (Heuer et al., 1983).
Hence, the problem here was not simply use of a lining
outside of previous experience.

cohesive soil

drag from
unsupported soilj
elevated lateral
pressures due to
arching

..,_

-m-:-ix.:t..e-:d-c7la-y-,-san---:d-,--t,~~11~ 7 hay and
l/i#.~~18 timber filling
and gravel
angle iron
~~~HH 9 framework

The buckling strength of ring beam support systems, as
defined by equations such as Eq. 3, is based on fundamental
assumptions about construction methods and structural
details. These are:
a. The lining is assumed tc;> be in relatively continuous
ccmtact with the surrounding ground around the entire
perimeter, and

Fig. 6 Conditions In the West Wall at the Time of Failure

b. The ring beams are restrained and supported such that
they do not twist or buckle about their weak (Y-Y) axis.

These rings may have deformed outwards sufficiently to
relieve the load they were carrying. This movement was
not observed, perhaps because the deformation was small,
occurred over a substantial length, and no plastic hinge
formed. The earth pressure that was originally carried by
rings 7 through 10 must have been transferred through
arching, partially into the floor of the excavation, and
partially into the above ring beams.

Construction methods must ensure that these conditions are
satisfied. For linings of low ring stiffness, assumption "a"
is best satisfied by grouting the annulus between lining and
excavate~ structure. It may possibly be satisfied by well
developed wood blocking and wedging in relatively stable
soils. Assumption "b" is normally satisfied by supporting
the ring beams partially by the tie rods and partially by
friction between soil and the ring system. Soil pressure is
normally essentially horizontal against the lining, because
soil weight is supported by the continuous column of
confined soil outside the lining.
Both of these conditions were violated when the large
void developed outside the west side of the shaft in the
hours before the failure.

Accurate calculation of the loads in the upper remainin~
ring beams is not possible due to lack of information
Various estimates of the loads can, however, be made. Fo1
example, if the soils are all assumed to be drained with l
pore water pressure of zero above the water table, and l
Rankine active condition is assumed, then the ring thrus
loads would be about as shown in Fig. 7. It might b<
assumed that loads in rings 9 and 10 would be arched int<
the unexcavated "rock" beneath the excavation. The load
in rings 7 and 8 can be assumed to be arched into uppe
rings. If loads in rings 7 and 8 are distributed to rings '
through 6, the possible ring loads might be as shown in Fig
7. Peak ring loads would be in the range of 350 to 400 kip
(1.5 to 1.8 MN).

EXPLANATION OF THE FAILURE
Conditions which existed on the west side of the shaft
just before failure were approximately as shown in Fig. 6.
There had been one or more voids on the west side for
several days. Water was apparently flowing from the
gravel layers into the excavation, eroding soil which was
then being removed by the front end loaders as if it were
soil from the bottom of the excavation. Routine efforts to
support the cavities had not been successful. In the gravel,
the flow of water rapidly enlarged the cavities to the point
that use of hay and wood cribbing was inadequate. Soil
contact outside rings 7 through 10 had been lost for several
dozen feet around the perimeter.
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However, use of Eq. 3 indicates that the W24x6
members in the failure area should have been adequate t
support thrust loads of this magnitude.
The growing void in the lower soils undercut th
overlying clay soils. These upper soils would tend to settl
downwards, creating downward drag on the lagging behin
rings 5 and 6, as illustrated in Fig. 6. This downward so
804

Ring Force (kN)
25
50
75
100
r---~---,nr---r~~~~~o

1.

The minimal soils investigation may have resulted
from fast tracking and economic constraints imposed
by the owner. The owner's attempt to transfer the
responsibility for an inadequate soils investigation to
the contractor did not succeed because there was
insufficient time for an additional soils investigation
and because such additional investigations are not in
accord with usual practice.

2.

Re~ponses fr~~ the design supervising engineer
dunng a depos1t10n, led to the belief that the designer
had performed the "design" in accord with their
previous experience without giving much thought to
altern.atives, to the relevance of their previous
expenence, or to the consequences of having field
conditions different from those assumed. Had the
presence of clean sand and gravel been suspected,
st~el sheeting and ring beams, or some other system
with full surface support, could have been used in the
upper soils and should have prevented the failure.

3.

The failure would not have occurred if the large
voids outside the lining had not formed. Where
granular soils were encountered, particularly with
moderate seepage, the problem might have been
avoided if a thick grout had been placed behind
tightly placed wood lagging, or if liner plate had been
installed and backgrouted, to fill any initial voids
behind the support system. Short radial drains of
slotted PVC pipe might have been placed at selected
locations through the lining to permit controlled
drainage of water without soil erosion, to prevent
later formation of large voids. The site personnel
seem not to have been aware of the potential serious
consequences of such voids and did not take the
necessary steps to control the problem at an
appropriate time.

4.

As occurs so often, this failure resulted because
details of the design and construction process were
not adequate for the ground conditions actually
encountered.

fsupport

1or-~~r-----r-~~~~~~rin~g~s~

10
40~--~~~~--~~~~~~
0
100
200
400
500

Ring Force (kips)
Fig. 7

Possible Ring Beam Thrust Loads Before and
After Void Formation

movement may have been facilitated by overload and
developing failure in ring 5 at the blackout (discussed
below), which .led to i~creased loading and yielding of ring
6 a~ we~l. _Soil softemng by water used to extinguish the
earher fue m the hay may have contributed to downwards
soils movements into the void.
This vertical soil load, plus the weight of rings 5 through

10, would have subjected the tie rods between rings 4 and 5
to l~ads ~twe~n 10 a~d 20 tons (88~176 kN). Resulting
tensiOn failure m the tie rods would allow the entire ring
beam structure, from rings 5 to 10, to buckle downwards
and into the excavation, buckling about the weak (Y-Y)
axis. This scenario is in accord with observed positions of
the members after the initial stages of the failure although
the steel ~as s_o twisted after the large movements, and
covered With so1l, that the detailed conditions at the moment
of failure could not be ascertained.
Some experts theorized that the failure was initiated
because structura_l detailing at the blockout between rings 4
and 6 led to the lme of thrust from the rings coming slightly
to the inside of the center of the frame for the blackout,
producing a twist in the side members of the blackout. The
authors believe that the failure was initiated by load transfer
from the lower rings because of the voids which formed
outside the lower rings, and by downward drag of the soil.
~~ct~ral detailing at the blackout may have led to failure
mitlatmg at that particular location, rather than elsewhere
but the basic cause of the failure was formation of void~
outside the lower rings.
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LESSONS LEARNED
The engineers on the two sides of the litigation may not
agree on the lessons learned. The view of the authors (who
represented opposing parties) is as follows:
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